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I defend the theory that the reasons why some event occurred are its causes. Many
“counterexamples” to this theory turn on confusing two levels of reasons. We should
distinguish the reasons why an event occurred (“ﬁrst-level reasons”) from the reasons
why those reasons are reasons (“second-level reasons”). An example that treats a second-
level reason as a ﬁrst-level reason will look like a counterexample if that second-level
reason is not a cause. But second-level reasons need not be ﬁrst-level reasons.1. A New Causal Theory of Explanation. It is obvious that some expla-
nations of some phenomena speak of the causes of those phenomena. Simple
examples come immediately to mind: the bridge collapsed because the wind
reached a certain intensity, electrons ﬂew off the metal because light shone
on it. Much more controversial is the claim that every explanation of why
some event happened must say something about the causes of that event.
Hempel (1965, 352) proposed a counterexample to this claim, and philoso-
phers have been proposing them ever since. But believers in the existence
of noncausal explanations have to aim at a moving target, for different phi-
losophers understand the claim that explanations must “say something”
about causes in different ways. I have a new way to understand this claim,
one that, I think, is the most natural way to understand it. I also think that
the claim, understood my way, is true (with one qualiﬁcation) and can be
defended against the repeated objection that there exist noncausal explana-
tions.
My theory starts with the idea, which has been held by many others, that
explanations are answers to why questions.1 A theory of explanation, then,
should say what it takes for a proposition to be an answer to a why question.*To contact the author, please write to: MIT Department of Linguistics and Philosophy,
77 Massachusetts Ave., 32-D808, Cambridge, MA 02139; e-mail: bskow@mit.edu.
1. Among those who hold that explanations are answers to why questions are Hempel
(1965), with some qualiﬁcations; Van Fraassen (1980); and Bromberger (1992).
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All uOne standard form answers to why questions take is “P because Q”: “The
tide is high because the moon is overhead” answers “Why is the tide high?”
But there is another form answers to why questions can take. The other form
is “A/The reason why P is that Q.”2 Because answers and reasons-why an-
swers are, in some sense, equivalent: “The tide is high because the moon is
overhead” and “The reason why the tide is high is that moon is overhead” in
some sense convey the same information. But I think that, for theoretical
purposes, it is better to focus on reasons answers. (I argue for this claim in
Skow [2016].)
A theory built around reasons-why answers will ﬁll in the schema
1. A reason why P is that Q if and only if . . .
What should the claim that “explanations of events are causal” look like, if
put into the form 1? Let “P” hold the place for a sentence that describes the
occurrence of an event. Here is my proposal:2. I ig
cover
3. I d
ing”
a cau
se sub(T) A reason why P is that Q if and only if the fact that Q is a cause of the
fact that P.The same kinds of examples that lend credence to the idea that explanations
of events are causal lend credence to its translation T into the language of
reasons. The lighting of the fuse caused the bomb to go off; sure enough,
it is also true that the reason why the bomb went off is that the fuse was
lit. The electron’s passing through a magnetic ﬁeld caused it to accelerate;
sure enough, the reason why it accelerated is that it passed through a mag-
netic ﬁeld. But, the same examples philosophers have thought are counter-
examples to the idea that explanations of events are causal also threaten to be
counterexamples to T.
A bunch of these examples, I think, are based on the same mistake. There
is a distinction to be made between “levels” of reasons. The examples fail
because they confuse the two levels.3 My aim in this article is to introduce
the distinction and show how it can be used to defuse some examples. I will
look, in particular, at Sober’s (1983) claim that equilibrium explanations are
noncausal and Lange’s (2013) claim that “distinctively mathematical” ex-
planations are noncausal.nore here the forms used to give “teleological” explanations; I extend my theory to
teleological explanations in Skow (2016).
o think that one kind of counterexample succeeds against T: examples of “ground-
explanations. My true view is that every reason why a given event occurred is either
se or a ground of its occurrence. But I ignore grounding explanation in this article.
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LEVELS OF REASONS AND CAUSAL EXPLANATION 9072. Levels of Reasons. The distinction I want to introduce is that between
• a fact R being a reason why some event E occurred: then R is a “ﬁrst-
level” reason; and
• a fact F being a reason why R is a reason why E occurred: then F is a
“second-level” reason, a reason why something else is a reason.
Reasons on the two different levels appear in answers to different why ques-
tions. The ﬁrst-level reasons are the facts that belong in the complete answer
to the question why E occurred. The second-level reasons, however, belong
in the answer to a different why question: the question, concerning some
reason R why E occurred, of why R is a reason why E occurred.
It is easy to come up with examples of ﬁrst-level reasons. If I strike a
match and, by striking it, cause it to light, then one reason why the match
lit is that I struck it. What about an example of a second-level reason? We
can ﬁnd one by looking for the answer to the question of why the fact that
I struck the match is a reason why the match lit. One answer is as follows:
one reason why the fact that I struck the match is a reason why the match
lit is that there was oxygen in the room at the time. (In general, background
conditions to a cause’s causing its effect are reasons why the cause is a rea-
son why its effect happened.)
3. Second-Level Reasons Need Not Be First-Level Reasons. Here is the
thesis about levels of reasons that I will defend:All A fact can be a second-level reason without being a ﬁrst-level reason. A
fact F can be a reason why R is a reason why E happened, without F itself
being a reason why E happened.I say that F need not itself be a reason why E happened; I do not say that it
cannot. The example I gave earlier shows that sometimes F is also a reason
why E happened. The presence of oxygen, apart from being a reasonwhy the
striking of the match is a reason why the match lit, is also itself a reason why
the match lit. But it is not always like this.
Here is an example in which a second-level reason is not also a ﬁrst-level
reason. Jill throws a rock at a window, Joan sticks out her mitt and catches
the rock, and the window remains intact. The fact that Joan stuck out her mitt
is a reason why the window remained intact. There is the ﬁrst-level reason.
Why is it a reason? The reasonwhy it is a reason is that Jill threw a rock at the
window. (If Jill had not thrown, certainly Joan’s sticking out her mitt would
not have been a reason why the window remained intact. The windowwould
not have “needed” Joan’s help.) But this second-level reason is not also aThis content downloaded from 018.101.008.092 on May 14, 2018 06:03:50 AM
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All uﬁrst-level reason: that Jill threw a rock is not a reason why the window re-
mained intact.4
In this case, the second-level reason that is not also a ﬁrst-level reason is
a fact that “corresponds” to the occurrence of an event: Jill’s throwing of the
rock. According to my theory T, ﬁrst-level reasons why events occur all cor-
respond to events, since they are all causes. But not all second-level reasons
are like the two examples we have seen so far (Jill’s throw, the presence of
oxygen); not all second-level reasons correspond to events.
In fact, I hold that laws of nature are second-level reasons that are not
also ﬁrst-level reasons. If I drop a rock from 1 meter above the ground,
and it hits the ground at a speed of 4.4 meters/second, the fact that I dropped
it from 1 meter up is a reason why it hit the ground at 4.4 meters/second.
The law relating impact speed s to drop height d, namely s 5
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2dg
p
(as-
suming drag is negligible and d is small), is a second-level reason: it is a
reason why my dropping the rock from 1 meter up is a reason why the rock
was going 4.4 meters/second when it landed. But it is not, in my view, also a
ﬁrst-level reason. It is not a reason why the rock hit the ground at 4.4 me-
ters/second.
Mentioning laws of nature brings to mind Hempel’s deductive nomolog-
ical (DN) model of explanation, which says that an explanation of a fact F is
a conjunction of facts that (i) entails F and (ii) essentially contains a law among
its conjuncts (Hempel 1965). Hempel’s theory is not framed as a theory of
the reasons why facts obtain, but it is natural to interpret it as entailing that
whenever there are any reasons why some fact obtains, at least one of the
reasons is a law of nature. Hempel’s theory is widely rejected, but I have
a new diagnosis of where it goes wrong. Its mistake is to take certain second-
level reasons, laws of nature, to also be ﬁrst-level reasons.
I asserted without argument that laws are second-level reasons, but this is
a natural view to have, on certain approaches to causation. One approach to
causation takes laws to be central: whenever you have a cause and effect C
and E, there are some laws connecting C to E—and C is a cause of E because
of those connecting laws.5 But that is just to say that whenever C is a cause of
E, some law is a reason why C is a cause of E. Now I hold that when some
fact F is a reason why C is a cause of E, then F is also a reason why C is a
reason why E happened. So it follows from this theory of causation that laws
are second-level reasons. If you start here, and in addition think that second-
level reasons are always also ﬁrst-level reasons, you head toward the char-4. This is the kind of example many take to show that causation is not transitive; see
Hitchcock (2001).
5. Hempel (1965, 349) endorses something like this idea about causation. It has had
many other defenders.
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LEVELS OF REASONS AND CAUSAL EXPLANATION 909acteristic thesis of the DN model, the thesis that among the reasons why
some event happens is always at least one law. But this line of thought is fal-
lacious because second-level reasons need not be ﬁrst-level reasons, and, on
my view, laws that are second-level reasons are never ﬁrst-level reasons.
I admit that I have given no direct argument that laws are not ﬁrst-level
reasons. I would like to put the burden on the other side: why think they
are? They are certainly second-level reasons: they are certainly reasons
why causes are reasons why their effects happen. But as the Joan and Jill ex-
ample shows, second-level reasons are not always ﬁrst-level reasons. So
why think they are in the case of laws? Certainly we have a sense that laws
are “explaining something”; my view captures this sense, by assigning them
the role of explaining why causes explain their effects. Why is that not
enough?
4. How the Levels Can Get Confused. I said that theﬂaw in theDNmodel
is that it misclassiﬁes laws, which are second-level reasons, as ﬁrst-level rea-
sons. I also sketched an argument (with a false premise) that leads to this
misclassiﬁcation: “laws are second-level reasons, and second-level reasons
are always ﬁrst-level reasons, so laws are also ﬁrst-level reasons.” But I am
not saying that Hempel or anyone else ever entertained this argument explic-
itly. Is there anything else to be said about how and why supporters of the
DN model might have come to misclassify laws as ﬁrst-level reasons?
Yes, there is. Pragmatic effects, effects of the rules of conversation on in-
formation exchange, can produce “data” that misleadingly suggest that laws
are ﬁrst-level reasons.
The reasons why an event happened are the parts of the answer to the
question of why it happened. So if we come across a conversation in which
one person asks “Why did E happen?” and another person answers this ques-
tion by citing some fact F—and if that answer strikes us as correct—then we
have some good evidence that F really is a reason why E happened.
Some of the evidence that laws are reasons why events happen appears to
ﬁt this pattern. Imagine someone walks into the room just as the rock hits the
ground at 4.4 meters/second, and she sees that it hit at this speed (maybe the
rock fell onto a device that measures impact speeds). A curious person, she
asks me why it hit the ground at 4.4 meters/second. I respond, “Well, I
dropped it from 1 meter up, and impact speed s is related to drop height d
by the law s 5
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2dg
p
(and of course
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2  1  9:8p ≈ 4:4).” Have I an-
swered her question?And does the law that s 5
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2dg
p
appear inmy answer?
If so, then the law is a reason why the rock hit the ground at 4.4 meters/
second—is it not?
If the answers to these questions are yes, yes, and yes, then, at least in
some cases, a law is a reasonwhy an event occurred. It is not hard to get from
this conclusion to the claim (characteristic of the DNmodel) that this is so inThis content downloaded from 018.101.008.092 on May 14, 2018 06:03:50 AM
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All uall cases and that when someone answers a why question without mention-
ing a law, her answer is incomplete.6
But the answers to these questions are not yes, yes, and yes. To explain
what I think is going on I need to introduce another distinction: the distinc-
tion between a good response to a question and an answer to a question. If
someone asks a question, obviously one good way to respond is to answer
the question. But not every good response is an answer.
A simple example sufﬁces to establish this. Sally asks whether Caleb is
coming to the party. I know he is supposed to go to the party. I respond
by saying, “He’s sick.” This is a good response. But it is not an answer.
The only two possible answers are yes (he is coming) and no (he is not com-
ing). I did not say either of those things.
There is a theoretical reason why we should expect there to be good re-
sponses that are not answers. The notion of an answer is a semantic one.
But the notion of a good response is a pragmatic one. Whether a response
to a question is good is a matter of what a cooperative speaker should say.
In some circumstances, a cooperative speaker should respond to a question
by doing something other than, or somethingmore than, answering the ques-
tion. In the simple example, I know that if I just answer the question by say-
ing no, then Sally will immediately ask mewhy he is not coming. Since I can
foresee that she will ask that, and since I know the answer to this question
too, I respond to her explicit question not by answering it but by answering
the expected follow-up question. It is okay in this case not to explicitly an-
swer the question she asked because what I do say, my answer to the expected
follow-up, conversationally implies that the answer to her explicit question
is no.
I did not, however, need to be so indirect. I could have responded by an-
swering both questions. I could have said, “no, he’s sick.”Here my response
is good, but again it contains information that is not part of the answer to the
question she explicitly asked.What keeps it from being a bad response is that
the additional information is relevant to the topic of our conversation, and it
is relevant because, although it is not an answer to her question, it is an an-
swer to an expected follow-up question.
I think the same thing is going on in the dropped rock example. I responded
to the question by saying “Well, I dropped it from 1 meter up, and impact
speed s is related to drop height d by the law s 5
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2dg
p
.” My response is
a good one, but it does not follow that every part of my response is part
of an answer to the question asked. In my view, the ﬁrst part of my re-
sponse—“I dropped it from 1 meter”—is an answer to the explicit question
(“why did the rock hit the ground at 4.4 meters/second?”), but the second6. This “incompleteness” defense is most fully developed by Railton (1981). For one
thorough argument against it, see Woodward (2003), chap. 4.
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LEVELS OF REASONS AND CAUSAL EXPLANATION 911part, the law, is not. It, instead, is an answer to an unasked follow-up why
question, a follow-up question I can anticipate would be asked immediately
if I only answered the explicit question. The follow-up is, why is the fact that
I dropped it from 1 meter up a reason why it hit the ground at 4.4 meters/
second?
In summary: it is often a good thing to include a second-level reason in a
response to the question why some event happened, but the fact that this is
good thing to do is compatible with that second-level reason not being a rea-
son why that event happened.
5. Equilibrium Explanations. I now have two distinctions: that between
ﬁrst- and second-level reasons and that between a good response to a why
question and an answer to a why question. The two together provide the
key to defusing many problem cases for T, the thesis that the reasons why
something happened are its causes.
Sober argued that equilibrium explanations are not causal explanations.
His main example of an equilibrium explanation was Fisher’s answer to
the question of why the ratio of males to females in the current adult human
population is (very close to) 1∶1 (Fisher 1931). “The main idea” of Fisher’s
answer, Sober reports, “is that if a population ever departs from equal num-
bers of males and females, there will be a reproductive advantage favoring
parental pairs that overproduce the minority sex. A 1∶1 ratio will be the re-
sulting equilibrium point” (Sober 1983, 201). Parents who overproduce the
minority sex are likely to have more grandchildren. So if males outnumber
females in the population, the ﬁtter trait is to be disposed to have more fe-
male children thanmale; being the ﬁtter trait, this disposition should increase
in frequency, with the result that the sex ratio is pushed from male-biased
toward equality. The opposite happens if females outnumber males. Sober
claims that this is not a causal explanation since “a causal explanation . . .
would presumably describe some earlier state of the population and the evo-
lutionary forces that moved the population to its present conﬁguration. . . .
Where causal explanation shows how the event to be explained was in fact
produced, equilibrium explanation shows how the event would have oc-
curred regardless of which of a variety of causal scenarios actually tran-
spired” (202). In other words: Fisher’s explanation does not say, for exam-
ple, that the sex ratio in the year 1000 was such and such and that this caused
the sex ratio in the year 1100 to be such and such, and so on. Instead it con-
sists of a bunch of conditional facts: for each year in the sufﬁciently distant
past, if the sex ratio in that year had had any “non-extreme” value (non-
extreme meaning not all males or females), then the sex ratio today still
would have been 1∶1.
The ﬁrst thing I want to say is that Sober makes a claim about what the
causes of the current sex ratio are that I reject. He thinks that the only rele-This content downloaded from 018.101.008.092 on May 14, 2018 06:03:50 AM
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All uvant causes of the fact that the sex ratio is currently 1∶1 are facts of the form
the sex ratio at time T is m ∶n. I am with those who reject this claim. The fact
that the sex ratio in 1000 was m∶n is “too speciﬁc” to be a cause of the cur-
rent sex ratio. There is a less speciﬁc fact, the fact that the percentage of
males in 1000 was not 0% or 100%, that is as well placed to be the cause.
The less speciﬁc fact is “better proportioned” to the effect than the more spe-
ciﬁc one, so it gets to be the cause.7
My disagreement with Sober might not seem to help much. Fisher’s ex-
planation is still a counterexample to T, is it not? Even if the cause of the cur-
rent sex ratio is that the sex ratio in the past was never extreme, Fisher’s ex-
planation does not cite this cause either; his explanation instead contains a
bunch of other facts, namely, the conditional facts described earlier. Does it
follow that these conditional facts, which are not causes, are reasons why
the sex ratio is 1∶1 and thus that T is false?
I deny that those conditional facts that Fisher offers up are reasons why
the sex ratio is 1∶1. But I cannot just say this, for when Fisher offered those
facts up in response to the question of why the sex ratio of 1∶1, everyone
celebrated his response; they did not reject it. How can his response be some-
thing to celebrate, if it did not answer the question?
The distinctions I introduced earlier show why. Fisher’s response was
something to celebrate because it was a good response to the question.
But it can be a good response without containing an answer; in fact, that
is exactly what I think is going on.
I think that the reason why the sex ratio is now 1∶1 is that the sex ratio in
the past was never extreme. But this is not something anyone would believe,
or even be able to come to know, without an accompanying answer to the
question of why that is the reason. So a good response to the question of
why the sex ratio is now 1∶1 must include an answer to the question of why
the fact that the sex ratio was never extreme in the past is a reason why it is
1∶1 now. And that is the question that the conditionals in Fisher’s response
constitute an answer to. Those conditional facts are second-level reasons
why some other fact is a reason why the sex ratio is 1∶1.
6. “Distinctively Mathematical” Explanations. Lange (2013) has re-
cently described a class of explanations that he calls distinctively mathemat-
ical explanations and argued that they are not causal explanations. My inter-
est is not in whether his examples qualify as noncausal by his criteria but in
whether they are counterexamples to T. Here is one of his examples (also
discussed in detail by Pincock [2007]):7. A “proportionality requirement” on causation is defended in Yablo (1992) and Strevens
(2008).
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All Why did a given person [say, Jones] on a given occasion not succeed in
crossing all of the bridges of Königsberg exactly once (while remaining al-
ways on land or on a bridge rather than in a boat, for instance, and while
crossing any bridge completely once having begun to cross it)? . . . [Be-
cause] in the bridge arrangement, considered as a network, it is not the case
that either every vertex or every vertex but two is touched by an even num-
ber of edges. Any successful bridge-crosser would have to enter a given
vertex exactly as many times as she leaves it unless that vertex is the start
or the end of her trip. So among the vertices, either none (if the trip starts
and ends at the same vertex) or two could touch an odd number of edges.
(Lange 2013, 488–89)Here is what Lange says about why explanations like this one are not causal
explanations: “these explanations explain not by describing the world’s
causal structure, but roughly by revealing that the explanandum is more nec-
essary than ordinary causal laws are” (2013, 491). There is deﬁnitely some-
thing right, and deep, in what Lange says. But I do not think that his exam-
ples are counterexamples to T.
Let P be the property of bridge arrangements that a bridge arrangement
has if and only if either every landmass or every landmass but two is met
by an even number of bridges. The (supposed) answer to the question of
why Jones failed that Lange presents boils down to this:
2. The bridges of Königsberg lacked P, and, necessarily, if a bridge ar-
rangement lacks P, then no one can cross all the bridges exactly once
(I am going to take Lange’s qualiﬁcations about always remaining on
land, etc., as given).
Now if 2 really is the answer to the question, then my theory is false. So is 2
the answer? There are two parts to 2. First is the fact that the bridges lacked
P. Now it is no problem for my theory to recognize that this fact is a reason
why Jones failed. For this fact is certainly a cause of his failure. The chal-
lenge to my theory comes if the second fact in 2 is a reason why Jones failed.
For the second fact, that necessarily, no one can cross all the bridges exactly
once, if the bridges lack P, cannot be a cause of Jones’s failure.
I want to say the same thing about this example that I have said about the
others. Statement 2, I maintain, is not an answer to the question of why Jones
failed. It contains an answer as a part—the fact that the bridges lacked P. But
it has another part, the necessary truth, that is not part of the answer. How is
this compatible with the evident fact that 2 is a really good thing to say in
response to the question of why Jones failed? Because the part of 2 that is
not an answer to this question is an answer to an obvious follow-up whyThis content downloaded from 018.101.008.092 on May 14, 2018 06:03:50 AM
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All uquestion, namely, why is it that the bridges’ lacking P is the reason why
Jones failed?
Lange’s diagnosis of this example, and the others he discusses, is quite
sophisticated, and I do not have the space here to go in to all the things he
says about them. Let me at least, however, mention one further thing he says.
At one point he writes, “Even if [these examples] happen to appeal to causes,
they do not appeal to them as causes. . . . Any connection they may invoke
between a cause and the explanandum holds not by virtue of an ordinary
contingent law of nature, but typically by mathematical necessity” (Lange
2013, 496). I am quite taken by this idea that an answer to a why question
might appeal to causes but not appeal to them as causes. What might this
mean, in terms of reasons why? Here is a natural suggestion: maybe in some
cases a cause is a reasonwhy its effect happened, but it is false that the reason
why the cause is a reason why its effect happened is that it is a cause. The
suggestion continues: cases like that are examples of “non-causal explana-
tions.”
I think the suggestion is plausible: if there truly are cases like that, they
should be counterexamples to my theory. They are not, however, counter-
examples to my theory as stated. I should amend my theory to make it more
vulnerable:se sub(T2) A reason why P is that Q if and only if (i) the fact that Q is a cause of
the fact that P and (ii) the reason why the fact that Q is a reason why P
is that the fact that Q is a cause of the fact that P.Now the question is whether the Königsberg example, or any other example,
is a counterexample to T2. I have a lot of thoughts about this but can only be
brief here. Lange’s idea is that since the “connection” between the bridges’
lacking P and Jones’s failure is secured by amathematical truth (a theorem of
graph theory), the bridges’ lacking P, while a reason, is not a reason because
it is a cause. I reject this claim. Even if the connection is secured by a math-
ematical truth, the cause is still a reason because it is a cause. This assertion
requires defense, but I do not have the space here (I defend it in Skow [2016],
chap. 5).
7. Conclusion. In this article I have presented a new causal theory of expla-
nation that says that the reasons why an event occurred are its causes. I also
drew two distinctions: that between the reasons why E happened and the rea-
sons why those reasons are reasons, and that between an answer to a why
question and a good response to a why question. I used these distinctions
to defend the theory against the claim that equilibrium explanations and dis-
tinctively mathematical explanations are noncausal, and I believe the dis-
tinctions can be used to defend it against a wide variety of other examples.This content downloaded from 018.101.008.092 on May 14, 2018 06:03:50 AM
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